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“A Manxman, to be true to his native character, must be a Conservative ; for 
even if he pretended to be a Radical, he could in reality be nothing better  
than a hybrid, hanging between the two. According to the few pretended 
specimens of the article which he had seen, he believed the Manx Radical, if 
he really had an existence, though he very much doubted it, would be found to 
be a man either five centuries behind his time or five centuries before it, and 
most probably not himself sure which. From his conservative principles he  
did not want any change. He must, however, say something on the bad side of 
this characteristic. One of its worst features was an opposition to necessary 
and salutary reforms. This has ever been an unmistakable feature of Manx 
character. So much so, indeed, that great difficulty was generally found in 
introducing even the most beneficial changes, there was always the Manx 
predilection to stand still as long as they could, until pushed along or shoved 
along in some way or another.” 
 
Report on lecture of Rev T.E. Brown given at King William's College 
 
reported in Manx Society volume 16, 1869 
 
 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1. The three remedies to be discussed are all ancient civil suits peculiar to the Isle of Man which 
continue to subsist in largely unaltered forms. They are as a group substantially incongruous, 
the action of arrest and status quo petitions could loosely be described as injunctive relief but 
they are entirely distinct to the petition of doleance which is the Manx form of judicial review. 
 
 
2. The usefulness of the remedies and the question of reform will be assessed in the light of 
proposed legislative changes and other similar remedies, and their compatibility with human 
rights law3. Accordingly, the author will show that two of the remedies are intrinsically useful 
to Manx society and should be retained whereas the other remedy has no cause for its 
continuation. In such circumstances the Manx “predilection for change” should be overcome 
to institute reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  The Human Rights Act 2001 brought the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”) into force on the 
Isle of Man. 
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2.1 PETITION OF DOLEANCE 
 
 
2.2 Introduction 
 
3. The petition of doleance is the Manx system of judicial review. It has developed to be a 
means for the “ordinary citizen” of the island to obtain redress for perceived injustice4 done 
him at the hands of those exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions5, i.e. administrative 
functions delegated by Tynwald. Although the petition has strong similarities to judicial 
review in other jurisdictions such as the Channel Islands6 and England7 there are several 
unique aspects to doleance. Firstly, at its core it is a simple and speedy8 remedy 
unencumbered by legal formality9. Secondly, it retains many procedural idiosyncrasies. There 
are no permission requirements and frivolous actions may be controlled by the right to strike 
out actions for undue delay or want of standing. It had long been assumed that such rules 
made the courts more accessible to ordinary Manxmen. However, in the recent Petition of 
Whittaker10, the petitioner argued that the cost of defending petitions discriminated unfairly in 
favour of the wealthy. 
 
 
2.3 Usefulness in the Separation of Powers 
 
4. The petition of doleance ergo judicial review is fundamentally useful and indeed necessary in 
a democracy. Judicial review is a judicial function which takes place as a result of the 
separation of powers doctrine11. The essence of the doctrine is essentially that there should be 
 
 
4 See Bingham J.A. at 390 in In re Kerruish 1961-71 MLR 374 
5 See Deemster Moore at 355 in In re Ackernley 1961-71 MLR 354 (as approved by Deemster Doyle appearing alone 
in ths Staff of Government Division at paragraph 62 in The Petition of Hafner, 2DS/2007, 17 at 62): "In my opinion a 
petition of doleance applies only where relief is sought in respect of some legal wrong in proceedings either by a court 
or by some other tribunal or by some body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions” 
6 See discussion of judicial review in the Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey in the Guernsey case of Bassington et al v 
H.M. Procureur: GLJ Issue 26 p.105 (“Bassington”) at p.117-118 
7 Particularly in terms of the grounds of review. The grounds are properly described as illegality, irrationality and 
procedural impropriety. (See Deemster Doyle at 36 in MTM v FSC, CP2003/119). This is entirely consistent with the 
Diplock categorisation in the GCHQ case See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 
374. Lord Diplock divided grounds for judicial review into three classes: `illegality', `irrationality', and `procedural 
impropriety'; Petitions can now be made on the basis of human rights or European jurisprudence where applicable See 
In re Seaside Shipping, a case on MEQRs which apply to the Isle of Man under Protocol 3 of the Act of Ascension. 
8 In re Kerruish 1961-71 MLR 374 Bingham J.A. at page 390 (approved by Deemster Doyle at 53 in Hafner,Ibid.) 
stated that a petition of doleance provides: "within a comparatively compact community a simple and speedy means 
for the ordinary citizen to obtain redress for injustices which, in England, would be remedied by orders of certiorari, 
habeas corpus and the like. The essence of the petition of doleance is that it should be simple and, therefore, 
unencumbered by legal formality, and also speedy so that the issues can be tried quickly".. 
9 In the case of Re Lezayre Parish Commissioners (16th September 2002) (unreported) Acting Deemster Teare QC 
stated (at paragraph 15 of the judgment), “A petition of doleance is the form of proceeding in the Island by which 
decisions of public bodies may be judicially reviewed.  It has the advantages of being a remedy of considerable scope 
by bringing a procedure which is simple and unencumbered by legal formality.”; following Bingham J.A. in In re 
Kerruish 
10 Petition of Grievance of Donald Whittaker of 66 Beech Grove Silverburn Estate Ballasalla Malew read at the sitting 
of Tynwald on 7 July 2008 
11 The concept of the separation of powers can be traced back to Aristotle in his The Politics. 
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a clear demarcation of functions between - to excuse a Manx pun - the three legs of 
government - Tynwald12 the Council of Ministers13 and the Judiciary in order that none should 
have excessive power and that there should be checks and balances between the legs.14 To 
paraphrase Montesquieu15 were there no separation there would be arbitrary control. 
Therefore, the judiciary must be supervisors of the delegated functions preventing abuses of 
power. It would appear that the role of the judiciary is particularly important in the Isle of 
Man given that the separation of powers is even less perfectly implemented than in the UK16. 
 
 
2.4 The lack of procedural bureaucracy 
 
5. The island takes many positive principles from English judicial review including the grounds 
of review. However, in recent times England felt it necessary17 to alter its procedure to 
introduce additional formalities18 including a permission stage and a three month time limit19. 
Despite aiming at improving fairness20 efficiency and cost21, the latter two criteria have been 
favoured22 the interests which predominate are those of saving court time and protecting public 
authorities23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 the Legislature consisting of the Queen Lord of Mann, the House of Keys and the Legislative Council. 
13 the Executive. 
14 There is in all such separation systems overlap between the legs. However, the extent of such intereaction, how it 
takes place in the Isle of Man, whether it is useful, whether it should be retained are all beyond the scope of this essay. 
15 In his De l'Esprit des Lois (1748), “there is no liberty if the power of judging is not separated from the legislative 
and the executive. If it were joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary 
control; for the judge would then be the legislator”. 
16 Edge, P.W. (1997), Manx Public Law, University of Central Lancashire at 153, “the doctrine of separation of 
powers is imperfectly implemented in the United Kingdom, and even less so in the Isle of Man”; See further at 153 - 
179 
17 One of the reasons was the increasing number of application for immigration review. See, for example, Cornford ,T. , 
“The New Rules of Procedure for Judicial Review” [2000] 5 Web JCLI at 2. 
 
18 See Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules of England and Wales. 
19 Which should be regarded as a long stop; See Andrew Finn-Kelcey v Milton Keynes Borough Council [2008] 
EWCA Civ 1067 
20 See Comford, T. ar 6 [2000] 5 Web JCLI. “There was originally a presumption in favour of granting permission where 
the test of arguability was satisfied should be spelt out in the rules (Ch.7 paras 13 and 14) […] What is lacking is the one 
measure proposed by Bowman to improve the claimant’s position at the permission stage. Like the old Rules, the new 
Rules say nothing about the criteria for the grant of permission and thus leave matters in the rather unpredictable state that 
they were in before”. 
21 See Comford, T. at 5, Ibid., Although, the Bowman Committee’s terms of reference required it to "put forward costed 
recommendations for improving the efficiency of the Crown Office List..." that do "not compromise the fairness or probity 
of proceedings, the quality of decisions, or the independence of the judiciary" (Bowman Report 2000, preface p ii) in 
practice the Report is overwhelmingly concerned with matters of cost and efficiency. 
22 The author has no information or statistics on whether efficiency is an issue in the Isle of Man. 
23 See Comford at 7, 10,Ibid. “ as in the case of the permission stage, they are by and large driven by considerations of 
saving court time and protecting public authorities rather than of fairness or access to justice.”; “there are no criteria for 
protecting the claimant at the permission stage”. 
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6. The Manx situation is the polar opposite24. The courts welcome doleance sometimes even 
when improperly pleaded25. The aim of the Manx courts is to make justice as accessible as 
possible without allowing frivolous and vexatious claims26. In stark contrast to the English 
rules, the law is simply that the petitioner “proves his case”27. Even when an applicant does 
provide affidavit evidence cross examination is the exception not the rule28 since it is not 
considered necessary29. The author agrees with Bingham JA30 that the system can only retain 
its virtues31  if it retains its flexibility32. The current Manx model does so by continuing in a 
format largely unchanged since its inception. Insodoing this simple procedure saves both time 
and costs33. Therefore, it is submitted that a new rule for judicial review modelled on English 
law should be treated with circumspection. 
 
 
2.5 Time Limits 
 
7. Manx law relies on the equitable principles of undue delay34. The right to strike out does not 
solely depend on time, it depends on the circumstances of each case35, does not apply where 
 
 
 
 
24 Although it has been said that the time limit of 3 months is persuasive 
25 See Deputy Deemster Corlett in In re Holmes, ChD, CP2008/84 at paragraph 26, “It seemed to me as a result of 
those exchanges that Mr. Holmes might very well have a cause of action in negligence against the General Registry 
and that accordingly he could, if he thought fit, amend his current Petition of Doleance to plead negligence on the part 
of the General Registry and that his Petition of Doleance could continue on the basis that it was making a claim for a 
declaration of unlawfulness combined with a claim for damages, such a claim being permissible under section 44 of 
the High Court Act 1991”. 
26 Further, there is yet to be an outcry over swamping of the judiciary with doleance claims 
27 Affidavits are not technically necessary. In the case of In Re Kerruish Bingham J.A. stated at 389 : “In England it is 
true that the practice (and maybe, by now, the Rule) is that an application for certiorari must be supported by an 
affidavit, but the historical development and procedural requirements of certiorari in England are so different from 
those of doleance in the Isle of Man that in my view the best guide to follow is that provided by Sir James Gell in the 
Corkish case, which is to the simple effect that the petitioner must prove his case as in any other petition. There is, 
therefore, no mandatory rule of practice or law that a petition of doleance must be supported by an affidavit” 
28 Bingham J.A. in Re Kerruish at 389, “The essence is that the petitioner must prove his case. To this end he may 
support his petition by affidavit. If he does, the other side can apply for an Order requiring the attendance of the 
petitioner so that he can be cross-examined. In cases where irregularities by defendants are alleged, it may be that 
such an Order will usually be refused, for it will not be the plaintiff’s character or conduct or credit which is in 
question.” 
29 In Re Kinrade CP 2003/138 (14th May 2004) Acting Deemster Moran identified the Court’s discretion to permit 
cross-examination in doleance proceedings as being, “an exceptional course rarely allowed save where required by 
justice”. 
30 As he then was; now Lord Bingham. 
31 of simplicity and being unencumbered with formality 
32 Bingham J.A in Re Kerruish, Ibid, “This most desirable speed and simplicity, which I do not believe can be 
matched in any other mature system of justice, can only be achieved if the requirements of the petition of doleance are 
kept flexible in the light of the golden rule laid down by Sir James Gell in 1904, that the petitioner must prove his 
case, together with the implied corollary that the means by which he seeks to do so are at his own choice and risk. If 
the flexibility of this procedure should, at any future time, bring abuses and frivolous applications in its train, means 
can well be devised to remedy matters, for a petition of doleance is above all a discretionary remedy.” 
33 See Caine, S. at 9.1 in Law Society response to Petition of Whittaker, dated 28 November 2008 
34 The leading authority on time limits in judicial review is set out by Deemster Doyle at paragraph 43 in Petition of 
Seaside Shipping, ChD, CP2007/99. It is clear from that recent judgment that in contrast to the present position in 
England the Isle of Man applies the common law principle of laches within which there is no absolute time limit for 
bringing an action. 
35 See Deemster Doyle at 43(1), Ibid. 
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there are issues of general public importance36; and will be heightened by showing prejudice 
and/or change of position and/or acquiescence37. Clearly this is a flexible system. In contrast, 
proposals for new Manx rules moot the idea of establishing a time limit rule identical to that 
of England. 
 
 
8. That English rule38 states that claims must be filed “promptly” but “in any event not later than 
3 months”. However, that rule must be read in conjunction with a second rule39 which gives 
the power to extend time under the court’s general case management functions. Accordingly, 
there is tension between the two rules. Moreover, the lawfulness of the promptness 
requirements  was  questioned  in  Burkett40   whilst  even  England’s  own  guidance  manual 
acknowledges  that  pre-CPR  case  law41   on  extensions  of  time  will  continue  to  apply42. 
 
Accordingly there is a potential for legal action on the time rules thus creating the potential to 
restrict accessibility to justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 In re Malew Parish Commissioners (Ch.D.) 2001-3 N-5; as approved by Deemster Doyle at 43(5), “In certain 
circumstances a petition of doleance may be permitted to proceed even if there has been a significant delay. This may 
be the case where the petition raises on its face matters of general public importance (see for example Malew, R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Office ex parte Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482 and the Equal Opportunities 
Commission case) and where there is a strong public interest in the resolution of the petition on its merits and it is 
otherwise appropriate for it to proceed;” 
37 See paragraph 43(1), 43(4), Seaside Shipping; This is similar to the Scottish system as discussed by Lord Hope in 
Burkett whose comments were discussed in Seaside 
38 See Rule 54.5(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998; See proposed rule 14.23 of the draft Rules of the High Court 
2009 
39 Under the court's general power of management, “Except where these Rules provide otherwise, the court may- (a) 
extend or shorten the time for compliance with any rule, practice direction or court order (even if an application for 
extension is made after the time for compliance has expired)”; See proposed rule 7.2(2) of the draft Rules of the High 
Court 2009 
40 In the Scottish House of Lords case of Regina (Burkett) v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough  [2002] 
1 
W.L.R. it was held obiter dicta by Lord Hope and Lord Slynn that the promptness requirement was incompatible for 
the convention. Lord Hope stated, “The problem is that the word “promptly” is imprecise and the rule makes no 
reference to any criteria by reference to which the question whether that test is satisfied is to be judged.”; Lord slynn 
stated at 53, “It is a matter for consideration whether the requirement of promptitude, read with the three months limit, 
is not productive of unnecessary uncertainty and practical difficulty” Contrast Burkett with Lam v United Kingdom 
App. 41671/98), heard 5 July 2001 where the ECHR found that the promptness requirement was proportionate in ‘ 
pursuit of a legitimate aim’ namely the need to avoid prejudice being caused to third parties who may have altered 
their situation on the strength of the administrative decision’ . That decision was not cited in the Burkett case where 
Lord Steyn and Lord Hope concluded that the timing rules for judicial review breached the principle of legal certainty 
under the Convention. This oversight was noted in the post-Burkett case of Hardy v Pembrokeshire CC [2006] EWCA 
Civ 1008 where the Court of Appeal relied upon Lam to justify its refusal to find the domestic timing rules in breach 
of the Convention. It expanded its justification for doing so to include reference to the use of ‘ promptly’ within the 
Convention itself, and by showing that Convention jurisprudence permits laws that are couched in vague language 
provided the citizen is able to see with a reasonable degree the consequences of his action. 
41 Based upon Supreme Court Act 1981 section 31(6). 
42 The pre-CPR considerations are very similar to Manx rules including exceptions for issues of general public 
importance. See case of R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Ruddock [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1482 ; S 
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(Application for Judicial Review), Re [1998] 1 F.L.R. 790 
Page 8  
2.6 Usefulness – Sufficiency of remit and power 
 
 
9. In order to be useful individuals must have full access to the court to test the legality of 
inferior tribunals43 and a full range of useful remedies. It is clear from the case law that there 
is full access to challenging decision makers. Petitions have proceeded against the full breadth 
of the island’s bodies including the Attorney General44, High Bailiffs45, the Council of 
Ministers46, Ministers47, the Chief Constable48, Departments49, the FSC50, the gaming board51, 
and various tribunals52. Doleance is also waiting to protect individual rights when for 
whatever reason the statute has sought not to do so53. Further, petitions of doleance are 
effective from a remedies perspective. Following statutory changes54 it is clear that a full 
artillery   is   available   from   damages55    through   quashing   order,   prohibition   orders56, 
 
 
43 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Bill, 2 February 
2004, HC 304 2003-4, at 57 commenting on the possibility of excluding the right to judicial review in the new 
immigration appeals system 
44 Petition of Winnel (Ch.D) 1993-95 MLR 85 – Conduct of prosecution subject to doleance if not part of judicial 
decision or procedure (as restricted by s10(2) High Court Act 1991); In re Fredsriksen (SOGD) 1996-98 MLR 286 – 
AG’s discretion to order investigation under section 24 Criminal Justice Act 1990 subject to petition of doleance; In re 
Richardson (SOGD) 1996-98 MLR N-9 – AG’s decision to implement request for assistance under s21(2) Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 subject to review, see als. In re Hafner (ChD) 2005-06 MLR 430 
45 In re Hill – Decision of High Bailiff not to exercise discretion under section 16 Summary Jurisdiction Act 1989 
favour of jury trial subject to petition of doleance; In re Hafner (SOGD), 2DS/2007/17 – Decision of Deputy High 
Bailiff under s21 Criminal Justice Act 1991 subject to petition of doleance. 
46 See Petition of JG Kelly and Jackson Homes, CP2003/13 – decision of the Council of Ministers in respect  of 
planning application subject to petition of doleance. 
47 Petition of Malew Parish Commissioners and Corlett, CP 2001/21 – Minister responsible for planning decision 
subject to petition of doleance; See also Tilleard –v- Allinson, CP2008/1 
48 In re Culverhouse (SOGD) 2003-05 MLR 558 – decision of Chief Constable not to consent to advocates acting 
under section 17A Criminal Justice Act 1990 subject to petition of doleance. 
49 In re Manx Ices (SOGD) 2001-03 MLR 64 Department of Local Government and the Environment alleged non 
compliance with Article 28 of the EC Treaty re import licensing subject to doleance; Petition of Galloway, 
CP2000/70 – Department of Home Affairs decision to transfer defendant to the UK subject to petition of doleance; 
See also, In re Newberry, CP2008/29 – Decision of Home Affairs to transfer defendant to Lifers unit in UK subject to 
petition of doleance. 
50 Re: MTM (Isle of Man) Ltd (ChD) 2003-05 MLR 415 –Review of Financial Services Commission discretion not to 
award a corporate service provider’s license. 
51 e.g. Arnold Robert v IOM Gaming Control Board 1984-86 MLR 321 
52 In re Graley (ChD) 2005-06 MLR 520 – Decision of Interception of Communication Tribunal not to permit 
representations subject to petition of doleance. 
53 See leading case of In re Kenyon (ChD) 2001-03 MLR 1– If statutory appeal mechanism available, convenient and 
appropriate court has discretion to order it to be used. ; see also recent case of Thomas v Department of Education the 
appeal division held that the proper mechanism for an appeal against an interlocutory matter in the Work Permit 
Tribunal was via petition of doleance. 
54 The preamble to the High Court Act 1991 specifically states that it is to “extend the remedies available under 
petitions of doleance” 
55 Damages can be awarded under three circumstances: firstly, if damages would have been awarded in a private law 
action (Damages were awarded In re Harvey 1993-95 (ChD) 1993-95 MLR 415 where a DOLGE official had 
measured the position of a building, decided it was wrongly situated, which resulted in a stop order and the petitioner 
being ostracised in the community and leaving the IOM. He sought declaration that the building was correctly 
positioned and damages. It was held there was sufficient proximity to give rise to a duty of care on official’s part, 
negligent misstatement, foreseeable loss, damages awarded. Court directed that when a damages claim under s 44 is 
included in a petition of doleance, the cause of action (negligence, fraud, trespass etc) should be specifically pleaded.), 
Secondly, under EC law (as it applies to the island under Protocol 3). If EC law is infringed there is a right to 
damages; where the infringement is that the state acted outside the limits on its discretion, breach is sufficiently 
serious and state has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its power (See Wade 
Administrative Law, H W R Wade & C F Forsyth, 9th edition, 2004, OUP) . ; Damages are also available to afford just 
satisfaction for a human rights breach (Section 8 Human Rights Act 2001). 
56 Order telling a body not to perform a particular unlawful act held. 
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mandamus57, declaration58, injunction to the rarely used habeus corpus. 
 
 
 
2.7 Issues of cost 
 
 
10. The grievance of Whittaker59 was that planning decisions frequently appealed by doleance 
forced ordinary people to defend them. In his view objectors should be able to participate in 
doleance without risk of cost penalties”60. The author avers the only potential victim in such 
scenario is the defendant and that two general costs rules afford him ample protection. Firstly, 
costs follow the event61 and secondly, a party who comes forward only to defend a judicial 
decision in his favour should not pay costs62. Taking the two rules together, a defendant to a 
planning decision in his favour can have his costs and eat them. Moreover, the current rules63 
provide an equitable approach to objectors’ costs. Tilleard64 confirmed that an unsuccessful 
party would usually only be responsible for one set of costs65 except where a party deals with 
a separate issue or where distinct interests justify separate representation66. This rule equitably 
prevents a petitioner from paying costs to multiple parties arguing the same point as in 
Whittaker’s case67. 
 
 
2.8 The proper parties to petitions of doleance 
 
11. The court has the power to strike out claims for want of proper standing. Accordingly a more 
prescient question is – does doleance have fair rules of standing?68. Firstly, a party aggrieved69 
 
57 An example of a Mandamus order is the Petition of Crowe and Gill (ChD) 1921-51 MLR 247. That case held that 
(i) mandamus orders are never granted against Crown or its servants; (ii) They are only granted where there is a legal 
right of the Petitioner to the performance of some duty (iii) The concern of court is whether the discretionary powers 
of an administrative body have been exercised or not, not whether they have been exercised properly. 
58Petition of Reilly (ChD) 1981-83 MLR 118 -  Petitioners initially prayed for order to compel Local Government 
Board to issue a “stop” notice in connection with alleged illegal development of land by 3rd party. Petitioners 
subsequently amended their petition to seek declaration that the Local Government Board was guilty of an abuse of its 
discretionary powers. It was held that doleance was the proper means of obtaining a declaratory judgement relating to 
the conduct of an administrative body. 
59 Although couched generally and taken by Tynwald in general terms 
60 Further, his petition was based upon other baseless assumptions, i.e. that this followed from a situation in which 
only a third of costs are generally recoverable  even when the case is won. 
61 which means that the losing party must pay the other side’s costs 
62 See R v Liverpool Justices ex p Robert [1960] 2 All ER 
63 See paragraph Allitson v Tilleard at 41, Ibid. approving In re Corner House Research (2005) EWCA Civ 192 
64 Ibid. 
65 See Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1996] 1 All ER 184 
66 Ibid. ; See also R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex p Datafin plc [1987] QB 815 
67 The defendant parties arguably had no distinct interests in Whittaker’s case, but there were bi-partite, or even tri- 
partite representation of the same issues and interests. See Early Publication of the Select Committee on the Petition 
for Redress of Grievance of Donald Whittaker, 9th February 2009. BADRA’s evidence to the Select Committee made 
it clear that individual residents gave powers of attorney to BADRA to represent them through one Advocate. Further, 
the oral evidence confirmed that the position of the Malew Parish Commissioners was entirely in line with BADRA. 
BADRA later withdrew when they realised that this was the case. Further, Mr Whittaker had no objections different to 
those of the other parties. 
68 See paragraph 27 in In re Cussons 2003, “The advantage of the petition of doleance is that it has been a single 
simple procedure, which, as described by Glidewell J.A. in Re Nicholson "is obviously a remedy of considerable 
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always has standing; secondly, a non party aggrieved will have standing only if the Attorney 
General consents; and thirdly, where a petitioner seeks only to address a public wrong and the 
Attorney General takes a neutral stance, there is only a discretion to proceed70. If as in the 
case of In re Cussons there are what could be described as utilitarian objectives the case will 
clearly proceed. The only possible limit of the current system is the theoretical possibility that 
such cases could be “sifted” at the AG’s discretion. In Cussons it was recognised obiter dicta 
that the law could be expanded to allow standing even where the AG did object71. The author 
would welcome the courts to adopt this approach which would simplify the rules and prevent 
what Lord Diplock said would be a “grave lacuna” if such a technical rule prevented 
accountability”72. 
 
 
2.9 Proposed changes 
 
12. The government is currently considering the creation of a new Ombudsman73. This appears 
to be an informal mechanism for addressing complaints against government administration. 
However, alarm bells may start to ring when one reads the decision of the Deputy Bailiff in 
the Guernsey case of Century74. He relied upon the existence of a similar Review Board75 as a 
 
scope and utility, and is intended to lead to a wrong being righted as soon as possible". To apply further tests or 
different attempts to analyse the circumstances where an applicant to a petition has locus standi may merely seek to 
inhibit the development of the law rather than to assist it. The statement as to the law given by Glidewell J.A. in Re 
Nicholson in his three stated propositions, correctly, in our judgment, describes the law, save for the deletion of 'it may 
be that' in the following sentence: "Thirdly, where a petition is brought by a private individual to address a public 
wrong, as in the case of In re Kerruish, and the Attorney General, though not giving his consent, does not object to the 
proceedings, it may be that the court has a discretion to allow the petition to proceed." 
69 An individual or company that has suffered or is likely to suffer “damage peculiar to himself” 
70 The exercise of discretion will take into account the credentials of the applicant 
71 See paragraph 28, Ibid., “We leave open the question whether the Court should now accept a discretion in the 
circumstances described above even if the Attorney General does object to the proceedings. In an appropriate case it 
might lead to an injustice if the only bar to the court proceedings was the Attorney General's attitude to the petition.” 
72 Lord Diplock in Fleet Street Casuals approved at 28 in In re Cussons. That said, if a petition were prevented from 
proceeding solely on the basis of the AG’s decision there would be the fall back of making further petition of doleance 
of his decision. 
73 See paragraph 534 to 559 in the Early Publication of the Select Committee on the Petition for Redress of Grievance 
of Donald Whittaker, 9th February 2009; “Chairman (Steve Rodan MHK):It is intended that an ombudsman system to 
be known as the Tynwald Commissioner for Administration be brought in and we understand that that is in hand and 
consultation is about to start with the public but this is to be a system – I just want you to confirm your understanding 
– where complaints against Government administration are to be addressed and not a system of judicial review of 
court decisions, which is something different” 
74 As referred to in Bassington v HM Procureur [1998] 26 GLJ 86. “The Deputy Bailiff in giving judgment in Century 
(above) at p.234 at first instance opted for "judicial restraint" rather than "judicial activism" to use phrases taken from 
de Smith woolf and Jowell on judicial Review of Administrative Action (Fifth Edn), chapter 1, giving as his reasons, 
first, the existence of the Administrative Decisions (Guernsey) Law 1986 which set up an Administrative Board to 
hear complaints; secondly, the smallness of the jurisdiction; and thirdly, the fragility of its institutions, there being no 
government, prime minister or cabinet. He feared a concerted attack by English lawyers acting at one remove through 
Guernsey advocates. The approach of the Deputy Bailiff could not be better expressed than in the following passage:- 
"However, with the smallness of our institutions what is apparently a serious failure to go about an act of government 
in the right way can be put right by a letter or a telephone call and not a judicially refined missile costing in time and 
resources an amount wholly out of proportion to the perceived wrong". 
75 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Guernsey) Law 1986. As Dawes commented in his Laws of Guernsey, Hart 
Publishing (2003) at 46, “Apart from judicial review there is a Law which appears to have been an earlier attempt to 
provide a remedy against poor administrative decision making. This is found in the seldom used Administrative 
Decisions (Review) (Guernsey) Law 1986. By section 1any person aggrieved by a decision or action of any States 
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factor in dismissing a judicial review application. It would be a grave shame if a similar 
consideration were adopted here. 
 
 
13. Although the remit of the ombudsman is currently unclear, what is clear is that it would not 
oust the jurisdiction of doleance76. The comments of Lord Donaldson77 are particularly 
pertinent. He said, “(the judges) are an independent estate of the realm and it's not open to the 
legislature to put us out of business. And so we shall simply ignore your ouster Clause”78 . 
14. Therefore, the new role would have the result of putting into existence two mechanisms of 
review of administrative functions. This would create the opportunity for arguments with 
regard to jurisdiction and abuse of process. A veritable feast of legal uncertainty which could 
only prejudice the ordinary citizen. 
 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
 
15. There has only been opportunity for a whistle-stop tour of the petition of doleance. However, 
it is averred that the current procedure provides a fair and just method for dealing with 
doleance well-suited to a small jurisdiction. It is the author’s view that the partial adoption of 
English JR rules or the creation of an ombudsman can only complicate matters. It may be that 
in those circumstances Whittaker’s fears of a system for the wealthy are realised but they are 
not a present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
committee may apply to the States Supervisor, or HM Greffier in the cae of a complaint against the Advisory & 
Finance Committee. The application is considered by the Supervisor or HM Greffier and, if satisfied that the 
circumstances justify a review of the matter, he must refer the complaint to the Review Board[…] complaints will not 
be referred if the applicant has not a sufficient personal interest in the subject matter or if there has been a judicial 
remedy which has, unreasonably been utilized”. 
76 The role of Ombudsman would not oust the right to petition of doleance since the role of the judiciary in the 
separation of the powers cannot be ousted with major constitutional reform. 
77 On hearing of the government’s attempts to force through Parliament watertite ouster legislation in the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Bill (which sought to restrict the rights of the courts by ousting their powers 
of judicial review) 
78 The Guardian, 26 April 2005 as reported at 38 in Horne, H., Judicial Review: A short guide to claims in the 
Administrative Court, Research Paper 06/44, House of Commons Library, “Derry Irvine put his foot down implicitly 
and they abandoned that. […] Had they successfully pursued the ouster clause then we certainly should have been in a 
very interesting constitutional crisis. If they really did that - and people like James Mackay (the former Tory lord 
chancellor) thought as a matter of wording it was wholly effective and stopped up every loophole - we would simply 
have to say: 'We (the judges) are an independent estate of the realm and it's not open to the legislature to put us out of 
business. And so we shall simply ignore your ouster clause’. 
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3.1 ACTION OF ARREST 
 
 
3.2 Action of Arrest 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
16. The action of arrest is a unique Manx remedy which is said to have developed in response to 
the island’s unique geographical situation79. The action gives a creditor with good grounds for 
supposing that their debtor is “about to leave the island” the right to arrest him80 and/or his 
property81. What one may term the personal arrest and the proprietary arrest are separate 
causes of action. In both cases application may be made ex parte with supporting affidavit. 
Further, arrest is only available if the court is satisfied that the creditor has a good cause of 
action over the debtor and good grounds for supposing the defendant is about to depart the 
island based solely on affidavit evidence from the creditor. 
 
 
3.2.2 Personal Arrest 
 
17. To arrest his debtor a creditor must satisfy a Deemster by affidavit that he has good grounds 
for supposing that the debtor is about to depart the island without settling the debt and will 
“remain absent” without settling the debt or submitting to the jurisdiction of the Isle of Man. 
There are no cases which clarify the circumstances in which a personal arrest would be 
justified82. If the Deemster authorises arrest, the arrest is effected by a Police Constable who 
detains the arrestee in custody until he appears in court in respect of his debt83. This must take 
 
place at the next available sitting of the court. Once the debtor has agreed to submit to the 
jurisdiction he must be released84. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 See Deemster Doyle 60 in Raad v Sturgeon, judgment of 1 October 2003 [ (1) 2003-05 MLR N-9] approving 
Deemster Hayward’s comments. 
80 Section 1(1) Action of Arrest Act 1953 - “Process in an action for the arrest of the person of a debtor shall be 
issued by a Deemster on his being satisfied on the affidavit of the creditor or his duly authorised agent that such 
creditor has a good cause of action against the debtor and that the creditor has good grounds for supposing that the 
debtor is about to depart from this Isle and remain absent therefrom without settling the cause of action or binding 
himself irrevocably to submit to the jurisdiction of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man with respect 
thereto. 
81 See section 3 of the Action of Arrest Act 1953 as amended by Preferential Payments and Other Acts (Financial 
Adjustments) Act 1973; The procedure for the arrest of property is slightly different 
82 Although guidelines have been laid down for proprietary arrest in Raad v Sturgeon. 
83 See section 1(2) of the Action of Arrest Act 1953 
84 See section 1(4) of the Action of Arrest Act 1953 
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3.2.3 Proprietary arrest 
 
18. Having once been or having been considered ancillary, the action of arrest of property is now 
enshrined in statute as an independent cause of action85. There are two procedures available 
for proprietary arrest - an ex parte application along the lines of the personal arrest or a direct 
application to the Coroner stating an intention to make the ex parte application with “all due 
diligence”. In both cases the creditor must have good grounds for believing that his debtor is 
about to leave the island86 and additionally that the debtor is “removing, or intends to remove” 
at least a substantial sum of the debt from the island and “does not intend to settle the cause of 
action”87. At the ex parte stage, the creditor must also swear an affidavit setting out his case 
and stating that the cause of action “is just and reasonable” and that the “absence of the 
defendant from the Isle of Man will materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his 
action”88. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 This is clear from section 3 of the Action of Arrest Act 1953 as amended by the Preferential Payments and Other 
Acts (Financial Adjustments) Act 1973 
86 but not that he will remain absent as in the personal arrest. 
87 The factors relevant to the dissipation of assets are set out in Raad v Sturgeon 2003-05 MLR N-11, and at SJ 
2003/119, judgment of 30th October 2004, paragraph [74](reported online online), “(1) the nature of the assets which 
are to be the subject of the proposed injunction and the ease or difficulty with which they could be disposed of or 
dissipated. The plaintiff may find it easier to establish the risk of dissipation of funds in a bank account or of 
moveable chattels than the risk that the defendant will dispose of real estate, such as his house or office. Nevertheless 
in appropriate cases injunctions can be and have been granted where the defendant's only known asset within the 
jurisdiction is his house. (for example if he has put it up for sale or otherwise indicated an intention to go and live 
abroad). 
(2) The nature and financial standing of the defendant's business. 
(3) The length of time the defendant has been in business. Stronger evidence of potential dissipation will be needed 
where the defendant is long established with a reasonable reputation than where little or nothing is known or can be 
ascertained about the defendant. 
(4) The domicile or residence of the defendant. The court will be less ready to infer that a defendant who has been 
based in the Isle of Man for very many years and has a home or established business here will remove or dissipate his 
assets. On the other hand however if the defendant though based in the Isle of Man has no strong or permanent or well 
established links with the Island or no continuing commitment to the Island and there is an indication that he may 
leave the Island, the inference that there is a real risk that assets may be dissipated and a judgment may go unsatisfied 
in the Isle of Man may be more readily drawn. 
(5) If the defendant is a foreign entity the country in which it has been registered or has its main business address and 
the availability or non availability of any machinery for reciprocal enforcement of Manx judgments in that country. If 
such machinery does exist the length of time it would take to implement it may be an important factor. 
(6) The defendant's past or existing credit record. 
(7) Any intention expressed by the defendant about future dealings with his Manx assets or assets outside the 
jurisdiction. 
(8) Connections between the defendant and any other connected entities who have defaulted on judgments. This may 
be of particular relevance when considering companies within the same group. 
(9) The defendant's behaviour in response to the plaintiff's claims. A pattern of evasiveness and unwillingness to 
participate in the litigation or raising thin defences after accepting liability or total silence, or late applications to 
vacate hearing dates, or discharging legal representatives, or failure to respond promptly or at all to correspondence, or 
the failure to disclose assets, or taking steps to transfer assets may all be factors which assist the plaintiff. The court 
however will have to have regard to the full picture and consider any information or points that may explain what 
would otherwise appear as evasiveness or unwillingness on the part of the defendant. 
88 and the “enforcement of any execution or Order of the Court consequent upon such proceeding”. 
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3.2.4 Purpose of the action of arrest 
 
19. It has been argued that the purpose of the arrest is to ensure that the defendant submits to the 
jurisdiction89. Deemster Cowley said of the predecessor act in In re Lethaby90 at 396, “I think 
the fundamental idea of the Manx Chancery action of arrest was to ensure an appearance by 
the defendant, and that the arrest of his goods was an additional protection available to the 
creditor”. He later stated91, “the effect of this statute is, I think, quite clearly to establish that 
the arrest of the person of a debtor is purely and simply confined to the enforcement of his 
appearance, but that in addition there is an ancillary remedy under proper conditions and after 
prima facie proof to arrest his effects and await judgment of the court.”. 
 
 
3.3 The Mareva Injunction (“Freezing order”) 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
20. As in proprietary arrest the Mareva empowers a creditor to apply ex parte for an order 
restraining a Defendant from dealing with assets or removing them from the jurisdiction 
pending trial. The Mareva is an equitable interim remedy92 and as such the court will usually 
require an undertaking in damages93 and consideration of the balance of convenience94. In 
addition, the court must be satisfied of three Mareva-specific conditions: firstly, that the 
plaintiff has a good arguable case concerning any cause of action; secondly, that there is a real 
risk of the defendant dissipating assets95 from the jurisdiction; and thirdly, that it would be 
just and convenient in all the circumstances96. 
 
 
89 See section 1(1) to 1(4) of the Action of Arrest Act 1953 and the comments of Deemster Doyle in Raad v 
Sturgeon (2) at [….]; Deemster Cowley in In re Lethaby (ChD) 1921-51 MLR 386 at 396, “I think the fundamental 
idea of the Mnax Chancery action of arrest was to ensure an appearance by the defendant, and that the arrest of his 
goods was an additional protection available to the creditor”; at 397, “the effect of this statute is, I think, quite clearly 
to establish that the arrest of the person of a debtor is purely and simply confined to the enforcement of his 
appearance, but that in addition there is an ancillary remedy under proper conditions and after prima facie proof to 
arrest his effects and await judgment of the court.” 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., at 397 
92 Arising under section 42 of the High Court Act 1991 
93 Although this is no strictly speaking essential. See Lord Diplock in Hoffman La Roche v Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry [1975] Appeal Cases page 295 as approved by Deemster Doyle at paragraph 37 in Raad v 
Sturgeon (1), “The court has no power to compel an applicant for an interim injunction to furnish an undertaking as to 
damages. All it can do is refuse the application if he declines to do so.” 
94 See Lord Diplock at 510 in the House of Lords case of American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon[1975] 1 All ER 504 
95 The factors outlined in relation to actions of arrest apply equally to mareva injunctions; see Deemster Doyle at 
[70] to [74] in Raad v Sturgeon (1) as well as headnote at MLR N-11, “In applications for orders under the Action of 
Arrest Act 1953, s3, and for a Mareva injunction, the court should consider the following factors” 
96 Deemster Doyle at 127 in Bitel LLC v Kyrgyz Mobil , CA2006/7. “To persuade a Deemster to press the button on 
one of the law’s two nuclear weapons namely a draconian freezing injunction (cf Donaldson LJ in Bank Mellet v 
Nikpour [1985] FSR 87 at 92) an applicant must satisfy the Deemster that: 
(1) he applicant has a good arguable case against the defendant namely one which is more than barely capable of 
serious argument, but not necessarily one which the judge considers would have been a better than 50 per cent chance 
of success (Mustill J in the Ninemia Maritime Corporation case [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600 at 605); 
(2) here is a real risk that judgment will go unsatisfied by reason of the disposal by the defendant of his assets unless 
he is restrained by court order from disposing of them. The applicant must produce solid evidence on which the court 
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3.3.2 Purpose of the Mareva 
 
21. The basis and purpose of a freezing injunction is to protect a claimant from the risk of 
improper dissipation of assets, which would defeat the efficacy of any judgment he might 
obtain97. Although not being an independent cause of action like the action of arrest, the 
Mareva injunction has powers over property similar to the action of arrest. 
 
 
3.4 Comparison of Action of Arrest and Mareva 
 
3.4.1 Similarities 
 
22. The above analysis shows that action of arrest and the Mareva injunction are two civil 
injunctions which share significant commonalities in relation to the restraint of property. Both 
remedies give a creditor the right to apply ex parte to seize assets within the jurisdiction98 so 
as to prevent his debtor dealing with them. Further, the factors relevant to assessing risk of 
dissipation are equally applicable to both remedies99. In both the action of arrest100 and the 
Mareva injunction101 the court will perform a balancing exercise between the rights of the 
plaintiff and the rights of the defendant so as to afford fairness to both parties. Further, both 
methods have substantial requirements which act as safeguards to the rights of the defendant. 
 
 
3.4.2 Differences 
 
23. The two most profound differences are that the Mareva does not give a Plaintiff the power to 
apply for arrest102and the action of arrest does not require an undertaking in damages103 
(whereas the Mareva does subject to exceptions104). Moreover, the right to apply for an action 
 
 
could come to the view that there is a real risk that the assets will be dissipated if the injunction is not granted; 
(3) t would be just and convenient in all the circumstances of the case to grant the relief sought.” 
97 See Deemster Kerruish in Kakay v Frearson , 5th October 2006 applied by Deemster Doyle at 129 in Bitel LLC v 
Kyrgyz, Dec 2006 
98 Although a Mareva can of course extend worldwide (see for example, . The action of arrest cannot. 
99 See Deemster Doyle in Raad v Sturgeon (2) at 70 -74 
100 See paragraphs 61, 62 Raad v Sturgeon (1), 1st October 2003; Repeated at paragraph 70 in Raad v Sturgeon (2), 
30th October 2003 
101 See Deemster Kerruish in Kakay v Frearson at [18], “the correct test is to consider objectively the overall justice”’ 
In Series 5, Laddie argued that the balance of convenience issue will need to be considered in most cases; American 
Cyanamid Co v Ehticon Ltd (No. 1) [1975] AC 396; It is always appropriate to consider the balance of convenience 
with regard to an interim injunction; see for example Customs and Excise Commissioners v Anchor Food ltd (No.2) 
[1999] 1 WLR 1139 
102 in the absence of test cases proving the contrary 
103 as clarified by Deemster Doyle in Raad v Sturgeon (1) 
104 The cross-undertaking in damages can be seen as a procedural safeguard which protects the defendant's article 6 
rights. However, there are situations in which the cross undertaking can be dispensed with (the “dispensation rule”). In 
the recent   English High Court case of United Securities & Exchange Commission v Manterfield [2008] EWHC 1349 
(QB) it was argued for the first time that the dispensation rule was incompatible with the principle of equality of arms 
under Article 6. Sir Charles Grey dismissed that argument out of hand citing the principle that article 6 only protects 
procedural rights not substantive rights (Approving the principle as confirmed in  Holland v Lampen-Wolfe [2000] 1 
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of arrest is limited to a very particular situation – a civil creditor enforcing against a debtor 
who not only has assets in the jurisdiction but has caused the defendant to believe he is 
leaving the island. In contrast, the powers of a Mareva are much wider extending extra- 
territorially105 and the procedures are substantially different. 
 
 
3.4.3 Summary 
 
24. There are many similarities between the Mareva and the Action of Arrest in terms of the 
restraint of property and a balancing test. However, whereas the Mareva has a wider 
jurisdiction in relation to diverse causes of action the action of arrest has a very specific 
jurisdiction in relation to civil debt which only accrues in very narrow circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
3.5 ECHR in Actions of Arrest 
 
3.5.1 Proprietary Arrest 
 
25. It is respectfully submitted that in Raad v Sturgeon Deemster Doyle only found the 
proprietary arrest to be compatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the convention106. He 
based his view on the public interest in the cause of action based upon the island’s unique 
geographical location107. The author endorses such compatibility and affirms the purpose 
outlined at 3.14 above as evidence of a lawful public interest. 
 
 
3.5.2 Personal Arrest 
 
26. Unbeknown to some, the strongest Convention right against personal arrest is Article 1 of the 
Fourth Protocol which provides: “No one shall be deprived of his liberty merely on the 
ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.” The Isle of Man has not signed up to 
that Protocol and in any event some commentators place weight on the words “merely” and 
 
W.L.R. 1573 HL). Therefore, the defendant's inability to have a financial remedy for his costs in the event of the 
freezing order proving ill-founded was irrelevant. On appeal, the argument was not pursued (On appeal Waller LJ 
paragraph  27 reported [2009] EWCA Civ 27 commented that it was “rightly not pursued”. 
105 The two most significant powers of the Mareva are:- Firstly, that it is available in support of a good cause of action 
and requires no evidence of debt (Only a risk that the defendant will dissipate his assets) and Secondly, it can be used 
to freeze assets outside the jurisdiction and to support overseas actions (See section 56B High Court Act 1991 and 
Securities and Investments Board v Braff, 1996-98 MLR ). The other ways that the Mareva differs are that it not 
available for small sums, it is available to any party (not just the debtor), is available against companies, requires 
proceedings to be issued promptly (not within 48 hours), allows ancillary orders to be attached to Mareva (See for 
example, Petition of Asset Management (in Liquidation) – discovery of assets on a worldwide basis. 
106 See for example, headnote to Raad v Sturgeon (1), 2003-05 MLR N-9. “Nor did the procedure under section 4 
breach the First Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights, art. 1, guaranteeing the peaceful enjoyment of 
property, since it was provided for by law and was in the public interest because of the geographical location of he 
island”; Section 4 details the form of order available in relation to section 3 of the Act. 
107 See Raad v Sturgeon (1) 
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“inability”. Accordingly, it is argued that an ability to pay coupled with a refusal to pay could 
attract imprisonment108. 
 
 
27. It is submitted that the question posed obiter dicta by Deemster Doyle in a recent 
imprisonment for debt case109 is most relevant to personal arrest. i.e. is the personal arrest 
compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR? 
 
 
3.5.3 Article 5 ECHR 
 
28. Article 5 is a right that is engaged at the point of imprisonment. There are 6 exceptions110 but 
arrest for a civil cause of action could only conceivably fall in to 5(1)(b)111 which provides 
that , 
“No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in 
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a 
person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the 
fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 P van Dijk and G J H van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn 
(1990), 488-489 as discussed in terms of Scottish law in 'State of ratifications of human rights instruments', E.L. Rev. 
1996, Supp (Human rights survey), 51-62 
109See Deemster Doyle at paragraph 13 in Kewley and Kewley v Megson, CLD, 3rd April 2008 (reported online only) - 
“The petitioner would have to answer the following questions:- 
1 is imprisonment for civil debt compatible with Article 5 of the ECHR?; 
2 Is it in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law?; 
3 would it fall within paragraph 1(b) of the Convention; would imprisonment be a proportionate response?” 
This was in the context of an application seeking imprisonment for debt. The island’s Imprisonment for Debt Act 
1928 gives a creditor the right to apply for a debt-defaulter to be committed to prison for up to 6 weeks on evidence of 
non-payment of a debt. By law the creditor need only prove that the defaulter had means of paying the sum due under 
order and that he has neglected or refused to pay it. Alas, even the de minimus requirements proved too much for the 
two ardent pursuers of the imprisonment of their fellow man made famous by the case law. Therefore, His Honour had 
no need to consider whether imprisonment for civil debt was enforceable in the face of article 5. It is the author’s 
view that this act must be abolished since it fulfils no purpose except punishement since the imprisonment does not 
extinguish the debt. However, a review of the usefulness and legality of that Act is beyond the scope of this paper. 
110 Article 5 
Right to liberty and security 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the 
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order 
to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent 
legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary 
to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful 
detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of 
unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country 
or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
111 As indicated by Deemster Doyle in Kewley 
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29. At first glance there is prima facie compatibility with the wording of the section. The acts are 
made by law112 and they have a clear procedure113. The terms “legal” and “prescribed by law” 
refer to conformity with national law and procedure and are for the national courts to interpret 
and apply such law114. Furthermore, a “wide margin of interpretation” is afforded to the 
decisions of domestic courts115. 
 
30. However, the more fundamental question is – “Can arrest or imprisonment ever be 
proportionate responses to a failure to fulfil civil contractual obligations?”116. Any restriction 
on a freedom guaranteed by the Island under the Convention must be “proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued”117. A measure will satisfy the proportionality test only if three 
conditions are met118:- 
1. the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental 
right 
2. the measures designed to meet the objective are rationally connected to it (they 
cannot be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. 
3. The means used to impair the right must be no more than is necessary to accomplish 
the legitimate objective 
 
 
31. Is it averred that there is a sufficiently important legislative objective which can be derived 
from the statute and the history of the action of the arrest. That objective is, a fair means of 
forcing debtors to appear for their debts to Manx citizens before fleeing the island. Like the 
proprietary arrest, this can also be justified based upon the island’s unique geographical 
location. In particular, the lack of border controls make it unusually simple to leave the 
jurisdiction119. The action of arrest was once open to abuse120, but over time it has developed 
 
 
112The Action of Arrest Act 1953 was lawfully enacted by Tynwald 
113See section 1 of the Act,,Ibid.. 
114 In the relatively recent case of Worwa v Poland (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 35, the ECtHR held at paragraph 58114, “The 
Court recalls that the expressions “lawful” and “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” in Article 5(1) 
essentially refer back to national law and state the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules 
thereof. It is, in the first place, for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law but 
the Court can and must exercise a certain degree of control.”; See also paragraph 58 in Bozano v France (1986) 9 
EHRR 297 
115As noted by Deemster Doyle notes in Raad in Sutrgeon(1), 
116 This is a question that has not been considered in the case law of the ECtHR. 
117 See para 49 in Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at 754 in Pannick, Human Rights Law at 3.10, 
page 69 
118 See Privy Council (Antigua and Bermuda) in  de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 69 
119 See letter from Lord Goodlad Chairman of the House of Lord Constitutional Select Committee to the  Chief 
Minister, February 2009, “Letter from the Chairman to the Chief Minister, 25 February 2009 , “The Constitution 
Committee of which I am Chairman is appointed "to examine the constitutional implications of all public bills coming 
before the House; and to keep under review the operation of the constitution". In connection with the first of these 
tasks, the Committee has been engaged in correspondence with the Government on the Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Bill which is currently under consideration in the House of Lords.  The Committee would like to seek 
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into a statute with many safeguards to protect the debtor’s interests121. In particularly, release 
is obtainable under rapid and certain conditions122 and the actionee may be awarded damages 
if the actioner does not pursue his action with due diligence123. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
32. For the reasons set out above the action of arrest should be retained in its current form. Cynics 
may see the action as a means of avoiding undertakings in damages in Mareva injunctions. 
However, the court has made it clear that an arrest action will not be sanctioned on that basis 
alone124. 
 
 
33. It may be questioned whether there is any need for personal arrest given the other nuclear 
options available. However, it is averred that subject to the many safeguards, the action is a 
unique means for securing incontrovertible service of an action and thus speeding up the 
determination of rights. 
 
 
34. Further, in the modern age there is a tendency for single individuals to be indebted to large 
classes of people. For example, at present the whereabouts of the notorious Alan Stanford125 
 
your views on Clause 46 in Part 3 of the bill which proposes to amend the arrangements for the common travel area 
that exists between the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man. It seeks 
to amend the Immigration Act 1971 to make travel between the different parts of the common travel area subject to 
immigration control. I have enclosed a copy of the Committee's correspondence with the Government on this issue. As 
the Bill is currently under consideration in the House of Lords we would appreciate as early a reply as possible to 
allow the Committee to make its report to the House”. 
120 The action of arrest has been part of the common law of the Isle of Man since time immemorial (Deemster Cowley 
at 393 in In re Lethaby) or more specifically since no less than several years prior to 1736 (the first written evidence 
of the right to an action of arrest is contained in the Fourth Law of 1737 agreed at Castle Rushen in 1736 which refers 
to “accons of arreast have for several years past been commenced in the Court of Chancery of the Isle”). It is 
interesting to note that the first four “arrest acts” all dealt with historical abuses of this empowering cause. The 
preamble to the Fourth Act of 1737 (not recorded by Deemster Cowley; see First Volume of the Isle of Man Statutes ) 
notes  the  many “groundless  and  vexatious” actions were commenced  and  prosecuted  without any “just”  cause 
(“Fourthly, And whereas many groundless and vexatious Accons of Arreast have for several Years past been 
commenced in the Court of Chancery of this Isle, and prosecuted without any just Cause of Accon appearing when the 
same came to an Issue, and yet the Defendants had notwithstanding been put to great Difficultys to find Bail, or 
otherwise lye in Prison, and sometimes Vessels and Merchandizes have been arrested till the Accon came to a 
Hearing, whereby diverse Inconveniencys have happened, especially to trading Persons; be it therefore ordered, 
declared, and enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That if any Person or Persons whatsoever shall hereafter bring any 
Bill of Accon, then and in such Case it shall be lawfull for the Defendant so injured to bring his Accon against such 
Complainant for the Costs and damages sustained by him by Reason thereof”; Fourth Law of 1737, Statutes of the Isle 
of Man,  Volume I);  and  the Arrests  Act  1748  records that  wrongfully “detention of  many honest  people”  by 
“unjustified” actions of arrest. As a result, both acts provide those wrongfully detained with the right to sue for 
damages and costs. 
121 The most notable one being that release can be obtained upon agreeing to appear in the action for the debt. 
122 See section 1(3) and 1(4) of the Action of Arrest Act 1953. It is unlikely that a few days imprisonment could occur 
under this system. 
123 See also section 8 of the Act. There is a duty to proceed with diligence or costs may be award to debtor. 
124 See Raad v Sturgeon (1) 
125 The owner of the Stanford Financial Group a multi billion dollar global wealth management group who stands 
accused of running a massive Ponzi scheme. In November 2008 he staged a Twenty20 match between England and 
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the self-styled saviour of English Cricket126 is currently unknown. Where the arrest of an 
individual127 could speed the determination of the rights of multiple Manx creditors that 
would be an another factor in favour of personal arrest. 
 
 
35. The court has shown itself increasingly willing to balance the interests of the petitioner and 
the defendant in actions that may engage human rights. However, to prevent the personal 
arrest falling foul of the arbitrary leg of proportionality as well as to provide further 
safeguards to defendants, it is averred that a balance of convenience test could be ascribed to a 
High Court Directive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the Stanford Superstars, an all-star team of Caribbean players awarding the victorious Superstars $US20 million ($31 
million). 
126 http://www.halifaxcourier.co.uk/sports-mailbag/Cricket39s-saviour-Sir-Allen-Stanford.5016918.jp 
127 meeting the statutory criteria for arrest. 
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4.1 PETITION FOR RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO 
 
 
4.2 Introduction 
 
36. The petition for the restoration of the status quo is an ancient Manx common law remedy. It is 
a very specific remedy which can be used if a person’s land is damaged or encroached. The 
right to the petition expires after six months. The requirements for a petition were clarified by 
the Manx appeal court in Guyler v Young128. A petitioner must establish a prima facie case that 
a right existed, either a right of ownership or a right of easement over land129, and that the 
right had been infringed, and nothing more130. On proving that case, the petitioner is entitled 
to an “order for the restoration of the status quo”, that is, an order for the restoration of the 
state of affairs prior to the alleged infringement. Such status quo orders have ranged from 
demolishing an extension131 to re-erecting a whole building132. 
 
 
37. The substantive issues are not to be determined at the summary stage133. The defendant to the 
petition has the right to challenge the proceedings in the Chancery Division134 by cross 
petition. On such hearing, the court may uphold the order, accept a party’s undertaking to 
restore the status quo and/or grant damages in lieu of the order135. 
 
 
4.3 Nature of the order 
 
38. The petition whilst proceeding summarily is a full mandatory order. It is averred that it is 
neither correct to describe the order as interim or interlocutory relief, since there will be no 
return date unless the defendant initiates a further substantive hearing. Therefore, in contrast 
to interim injunctions, the burden is shifted to the defendant to prove his cause of action. 
 
 
39. The author avers that although there being no reported reference to such, the status quo 
 
petition has the potential to be a draconian remedy. The cases show that the threshold for 
 
 
 
128 Guyler v Young 1952 – 60 MLR 23 (SGD) 
129 In comparison with the common law action for trespass to land there is no need to show undisputed ownership 
Lace v Teare 1961-71 MLR 32 (CLD) 
130 p29 Ibid., “I think the point is that the petitioner must establish the existence of his right, whether it be a right of 
ownership of land, or whether it be a right of easement over land, before he can obtain an order, and he must also 
establish thtat that right has been infringed, and nothing more” 
131 See Simmons and Simmons v Saunders 1981-83 MLR 42 (CLD) 
132 See Faragher and Sengoles v Watterson  , Common Law Division (Ramsey), June 26th, 1893, unreported , 
refererred to in Guyler v Young, Ibid. 
133 See Simmons v Saunders, Ibid., Guyler v Young (1) 
134 Simmons, Ibid. 
135 Young v Guyler 1952 – 60 MLR 86 (ChD). In the leading case of Guyler v Young, the cross petitioner carried on in 
contempt  of the  court  order,  and  was ordered  to  pay substantial  damages  as  well  as the whole costs of both 
proceedings. 
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establishing the petition is particularly low. For example, in Guyler v Young a plan of a 
carriageway marked in yellow but not referred to in the deeds was sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case for a right of way. Such trifling evidence produced an order for a whole 
building to be removed. Accordingly, to determine whether it should be retained it is useful to 
compare it with an interim injunction which could in theory be available on the same set of 
facts. 
 
 
4.4 Interim Injunction 
 
40. The High Court has the power to grant an interim injunction before judgment where it 
considers it just and convenient to do so136. The court applies the American Cyanamid 
principles137. Further, it is now established that the decision is more accurately an assessment 
of whether granting or withholding the injunction at that stage is more likely in the end to 
produce a just result138. In contrast, justice has no inherent role in a status quo petition. In 
contrast, in Chohan the court approved the Chadwick principles139 which provide a cautious 
approach to mandatory interim injunctions. 
 
 
 
 
 
136 See Section 42 of the High Court Act 1991 -“ (1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) 
grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do 
so.(2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just..”; 
Order 38 of the Rules of the High Court of Justice 1952 - “In any cause or matter in which an injunction has been, or 
might have been claimed, the plaintiff may, before or after judgment, apply for an injunction to restrain the defendant 
or respondent from the repetition or continuance of the wrongful act or breach of contract complained of, or from the 
commission of any injury or breach of contract of a like kind relating to the same property or right, or arising out of 
the same contract; and the Court may grant the injunction, either upon or without terms, as may be just.” 
137 The principles laid down by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords case of American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd. 
[1975] A.C. 396 (“the American Cyanamid Principles”). That approach has been various approved in the Manx courts 
( see for example Deemster Kerruish in  In re Poyiadjis at [270], Deemster Kerruish in Cambridge Gas at [18] to [19]; 
and Deemster Cain in Locke v Bellingdon Ltd. and ors., 1999-01 MLR [N-19]. The test is firstly, is there a serious 
question to be tried, secondly, are damages an adequate remedy and thirdly, the balance of convenience. 
138 See paragraph 64 in the Privy Council in Gujadhur v Gujadhur (PC Appeal No 51 of 2006) ; approved by 
Deemster Doyle in Chohan v DHSS, CP 2008/90 (reported online) at at paragraphs 60 to 61. 
139 Deemster Doyle in Chohan and Khan v DHSS approved Chadwick J in Nottingham Building Society case [1993] 
FSR 468 (approved by the English Court of Appeal in Zockall [1998] FSR 354) where he reviews the various 
authorities at page 472 onwards and having reviewed the relevant case law he summarised the principles : 
"In my view the principles to be applied are these. First, this being an interlocutory matter, the overriding 
consideration is which course is likely to involve the least risk of injustice if it turns out to be "wrong" in the sense 
described by Hoffmann J. 
Secondly, in considering whether to grant a mandatory injunction, the court must keep in mind that an order which 
requires a party to take some positive step at an interlocutory stage, may well carry a greater risk of injustice if it turns 
out to have been wrongly made than an order which merely prohibits action, thereby preserving the status quo. 
Thirdly, it is legitimate, where a mandatory injunction is sought, to consider whether the court does feel a high degree 
of assurance that the plaintiff will be able to establish his right at a trial. That is because the greater the degree of 
assurance the plaintiff will ultimately establish his right, the less will be the risk of injustice if the injunction is 
granted. 
But finally, even where the court is unable to feel any high degree of assurance that the plaintiff will establish his 
right, there may still be circumstances in which it is appropriate to grant a mandatory injunction at an interlocutory 
stage. Those circumstances will exist where the risk of injustice if this injunction is refused sufficiently outweigh the 
risk of injustice if it is granted." 
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41. The Manx law as it has developed for example in Chohan recognizes the restrictions that the 
law imposes on the rights of the defendant. A mandatory injunction carries a greater risk of 
injustice than other remedies. Accordingly, the court ought to consider whether it feels a “high 
degree of assurance that the plaintiff will be able to establish his right at a trial” before 
granting the remedy. The court will only grant mandatory injunction if the risks of injustice if 
the injunction is refused sufficiently outweigh the risk of injustice if it is granted. 
 
 
4.5 ECHR Considerations 
 
42. It is clear that the courts have a duty to consider the law in line with the ECHR. It is submitted 
that as per the action of arrest the status quo petition engages Article 1 of the First Protocol140. 
However, there can only be a deprivation of property in the public interest. In contrast to the 
action of arrest there would appear to be no such public interest in this case. Further, if, as is 
possible, a petitioner sought to remove a habitation, Article 8 would be likely to be engaged. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
43. As a Manxman the author feels a certain affinity with local laws which are largely unique. 
 
However, that affinity is soon put to one side when considering a law which restricts the 
rights of the defendant without a lucid raison d’être. It is averred that the evidential burden is 
misplaced. The court does have a duty to weigh competing interests, but that duty is only 
confused by the prima facie ease with which the status quo criteria are met. 
 
 
44. Although many learned Deemsters have discussed this ancient Manx remedy, none have 
stated a peculiarly Manx feature which justifies its retention. The author avers that the only 
public interest would appear to be the guarantee of property rights. However, it is argued that 
such rights can be protected by the courts through the injunctive relief provided by the interim 
relief available under the high court rules. Therefore, the petition should be abolished. 
 
 
45. In any event, the 6 month limit is arbitrary. If the action was to be retained, the author would 
propose that the limit is a short time limit extending from the date of the applicant’s notice of 
proposed works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
140 As in the Action of Arrest, above. 
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5.0 SUMMARY 
 
46. Throughout this paper the author has found himself in the position of Brown’s Manx radical 
unsure whether or not to swing the reforming axe. However, in the end, the author’s 
conclusion was quite simple. The above analysis has shown that the petition of doleance and 
action of arrest are useful and should be retained in their current form and the petition for the 
restoration of the status quo abolished. Further, in order to provide certainty to the law, it may 
be advantageous for the courts to prescribe a directive detailing the balancing act that will be 
performed in determining an application for a personal arrest since the author well recognises 
its potential restriction on personal liberty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word count: 4496 
Paul Rodgers 
Page 25  
